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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOAN HARRISON, WIDOW OF
WILLIAM G. HARRISON, DECEASED
Plaintiff-Appellant,

District Co·,,t No. 9-75-6507

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMcSSION OF
UTAH, BILL G. HARRISON ~liNING
COHPANY, and STATE INSURANCE
FUND,

Supreme Court No.

15401

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF T!IE CASE
This matter represents an appo" ·.1 from an Indust:·ial
Commission ruling which denied benefits to the widow of a miner
who had made a claim pursuant to the occu~ational disease and
disability laws of Utah.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Administrative Law Judge denied the claim of
Joan Harrisol!, widow of William G. Harrison.

A Notion to

Review was filed with the Industrial Commission a.r:d the Corn:::.ission
affirmed the decision of thE Adcr.in.istrative Law J•Jge.

T!"le

matter was brought before the St':7 :erne Court by Petitir_•_, for
Writ of Review filed by Mrs. Harrison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent reque.ots the Supreme Court affirm the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
decislon of the
Industrial Commission entered herein.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
William G. Harrison had been a uranium miner since
1945.

(R. 19-20).

On August 29, 1975, he fij_ed an

occupationa~

disease claim alleging disability as a result of silicosis

~d

cancer caused by prolonged exposure tc; "rock dust and diesel
smnke".

(R. 1, 63).

Before Mr. Harrison col!ld undergo med:;cal

examinatio;, he died November 6, 1975.
Mr. Harrison had been a smoker since

th~

age of

fou:::teen, at a rate of from one to on•' and one half packs per
day.

(R.

smoker.

23,
(R.

33, 40).

He was rated, medically, as a heavy

41).

The final diagnosis, given in an autopsy report
(R. 60-62)

states:
1.

2.

CARCINOMIA, SM-'.LL CELL CARCINOMA, RIGHT
UPPER LOBE WITH LYMPHATIC PERMEATION,
RIGHT LOBE AI;D RIGHT LOWER LOBE (WHO 2B)
PUk~ONARY

FIBROSIS WITH EMPHYSEMA,

MODERATE.
3.

SILICOTIC FOCI, ALL LOBES OF THE LUNG.

4.

PIJLMONARY EDEMA.

5.

REGIONAL LYMPH NODE METASTASIS,
EXTENSIVE.

,,t t!<e court's record,
Other medical recor d s, througho expand this analysis.

(R.

70,

72,

76,

77) ·

A medical panel was convened to review the records

report was submitted ~hlch concl~Jed as
of Mr. Harrison ar.d a
follows:
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Percentage
( l)

Speci fie causes of death:

a.

Occupational Disease
(if any) . . . . . .
::.one
Name of occupational disease-Probably Silicosis Grade I, (?
early Gr<!de II), of itself nor_
disabling.

b.

othe·,- diseases . . . . . .
100%
Name of such diseases--Small
cell lung carcinoma rig!1t upper
lobe with regional metastases;
and complications from cancer
chemotherapy; and history of
prolonged cigarette smoking;
with chronic bronchitis and
emphysema.

c.

Other contributing factors .
Description of such factors-It is recognized that the
decedent did have relatively
mild silicosis in degrr,e of
itself, not disabling.
TOTAL

100%

The chairman of the panel was Dr. Elmer M. Kilpatrick.
Dr. Kilpatrick testified that all of the panel mEmbers met as
a group and reviewed the records of Mr. Harrison,

(R. 133).

FurtLer, tl;e entire panel agreed with the result.

(R. 132).

The panel's report was dated

~-lay

8, 1976.

(R. 86) .

On June 7, 1976, an objection to said report was filed by
Mrs. Harrison alleging that Dr. Kilpatrick was "prejud1.ce and
oiased and thereby unable to fairly evalu,;te claims invol,ring
lung ca! cer allegedly from uranium m1.ning".

-3-
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A hearing on the oojec-r.ion was held January 26, l9:i
(R.

96) .

At that t:.me Dr. Elmer M.

i<ilpatri,~:-

testify in support of the panel's report.
E. Archer was

called~·

(R.

was called to
99)

behalf of Mrs. Harrison.

Dr. Vi etc:
(R.

112).

letter addressed toR. S. Ferguson of the State Compensation
Insurance Fund in Denver, Colorado, was admitted on Mot, (;n of
Mrs. Harrison

(R. 138-140) which aliegedly displayed

th•~

bias::

Dr. Kilpatrick.
Despite the allegations of the objection to the repc::
of the medical panel, no example of bias or prejudice, on the
part of Dr. Kilpatrick, was offered other L~an the letter ~d
testimony contained in the record.
ARGUMEi·iT

At the outset it should be understood that this :natte: I
is, in reality, notl•ing more t:~an a conflict between the views
of the two doctors who testified at the hearing.

In f~i.ct, tJ·~e

Objection to :-!edical Panel Repo:·_·t and to Medical Pan•' ~ is
nothing- more thar, an object~on to Dr. Ki:.?atrick.
is made to the o".her members of the ?·'nel, e•ren though th•o
agreed wi-r.h the results contained in the report.
In this ;:Togard, ::lr. Kilpat:-i:k ":esti::"isd t:"1at the
· rc,er
h
aware of -:he ·..;ork done ·-::JY "c-r .....
an d ~on~l~er~"
~
"'~
-~

• R. Funding
'-32-'..33)
Sponsored
by the repor--:.
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POINT I
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDEi·iCE AND SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE AFFIRMED.
The Supreme Cou::t ha..

often stated that w>ere there is

any subs<~,;,;_tial evidence on the record to support the findings
of the Industrial Commission, a reviewing court ca.,·,not do
otherwise but

affirm the judgment of the Co~mission.

Amal-

gamated Sugar Co. v. !ndustrial Commission, 56 U. 80, 189 P.69,
(1920) .
When there is conflic': of material facts aJ'd competent
evidence which might justify a finding either way, a finding
oy the Commission will not be disturbed, and, in such cases,
the cr•'dibility of witnesses and weight of evidence are
questions of fact to be left to the Commission.

Board of

Education of Salt Lake Cil:y v. Industrial Commission, 83 U.
256' 27 p .2d 805'

(1933).

The main issue in tJ;e case at bar was clearly stated
by the Administrative Law Judge when he said:
so it appears here that we have two diametrically opposed opinions from very fLne medLcal
doctors authorities in their field.
Crossexamination disclosed th.,• Dr. Kilpatrick
gen•;rally held that cign:..ette smoking was the most
common cause of the lung cancer c;,usLng death Ln
cases where the deceased or disabled LndLV:.dual was
a long-time cigarette smoker and that Dr. ctrcher
on the other hand generally D>led that th~ cause of
death was from cancer due to uranium exposure . . On
cross-examination, Dr. Archer noted that there nad
been very few cases, if any, out of some t•,.;enty

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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heard ,in Ut,_;h where he had tEstified differently
th,m tJ•at h~s op~n~on was that the cause of death
was uran~urn exposure.
Dr. Archer acknowledged
that there was a heavier incident of smoking
among m~ners [ s~c ] among the gene·,·al population
and tliat he CG•!ld only recall about one case out
of twenty o~ thirty where a miner had died of
carcinoma of the lung where the~e wasn't a
history of smoking.
The doctor further acknowledged that recent studies convinced him tha'.
the role of cigarette smoking is somewhat lctrger
than he had originally thought.
(R. 143)
In appellant's brief it is said, at p.'>ge 4:
Dr. Kilpatrick testified that in lung
cancer cases, if there is a sh<~wing r:f
,;rooking, he will ruJe aga:nst the appellcm:
nc matter what othe~ facts exist, i.e., extent
of exposure, type of cancer cells, or any other
conceivable facts.
(R. 138-140).
No read.'L-;g of the record can f:_,,d such a dogmatic
statem,,nt attributable to Dr. Kilpatrick.
rather different

His testimony was

At R. 101 we read the following:

(By Mr. Wilcox)
Q It is your opinion is it not,
Dr. Ki:patrick -- from what you have statEd in
other hearings before this, on this matter of
lung cancer in uranium miners -- t;,at if an
Applic .... rt claims to ha·Te l unc; cc>.ncer caused by
uranium employment, and is also a smoker, that
you would in all cases of that type find no
connection between the uranium mini~g and his
cancer?
(By Dr. Kilpatrick) A No, I wouldn't say that.
I think that we'd have to still say that no one
knows an exact single cause for cancer.
Q
All right.
But isn't ~t a fact that
in your opinion, if an App~icant_for lung-,
cancer benefits is a smoker, as ra as you re
concerned you're always going to ~ 1 d tnat t~e
Applicant is not en~itled to bene~ ts?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-oLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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. A_
I can't say it that dogmatically.
The
th~ng ~s that you have to recognize many other
potential carcinogens.
And, when you would
s~ngle out smoking, that is not tr1ie.
One need only read the letter which was admitted to
evidence, on motion of Mrs. Harrison, to understand the
position of Dr. Kilpatrick.

In part it states:

As far as Lung Cancer In Uranium Miners is
concerned, I am aware that there is some increase
in the incidence of this disorder in Uranium
Miners, as compared to the general population.
It
may be that isotope exposure to uranium may be a
co-carcinogen in the production of lung cancer, ~ut
the consideration of this feature is so mixed up
with other concurrent etiologies, that a dogmatic
statement cannot be made with exact relationsh:~ps
as to lung cancer being an exact result from radon
exposure.
It becomes apparent to me, and to the
other members of the Medical Panel of Physicians,
that in consideration of Uranium Induced lung
Cancer, the issue becomes one of probability VS •
improbability in the causal relationships. All
other potential factors pertaining to etiology
must be considered in the total analysis of any
given case.
In an attempt to up-date understanding in
the matter of causal relationships to Uranium
Exposure in Uranium Miners I have studied the
literature on the subject; discussed it with
oncologists, pathologists, cancer chemotherapists,
x-ray Therapy experts, immunologists, and M~ne
Safety Experts.
The studies of Dr. Victor E.
Archer, of the Nati.c.nal Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, Western Area Occupation,;l
Laboratory, and h.Ls publicatins, influences
the thinkir g of tl;e experts who say "yes'.' to
the questions related to -- "Is a dogmat~c causal
relationship between etiology of exposure to
uranium in mines, in the production of lung
cancer?''.
It is not meant that the work of Dr. Archer be
belittled.
I am of the opinion that no other
study
the
world provided
can by
come
up. ofto
theand. Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J.such
Quinney Law
Library.in
Funding
for digitization
the Institute
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general knowledge related to production of
lung .:::ancer.
On the oth•; r hand, in the end
analysis of a given lung cancer, in a Uranium
M~ner, considering the multitude of variables
concerning etiology, the end result rem;; ins that
we do not knew for certain the nature of the cause
and must say that "a co-carcinogen effect may exist
from ~sotope exposure, but the present knowledge
does not warrant a domat~c statemer:t that lt
In the correspondence, pertaining to the three
cases you referred to this office for review,
(Bucher; N~cols; and Church), I find at the end
of the letters of opinion from Dr. Archer, statements to the effect: -- "The a!:>ove opinions with
respect to the relationship of occupational and
lung cancer in the case of (---------) are my own
personal opinions, and are not tho',e of the
Surgeon General or of the Public Health Service.
In no way do I represent either in stating my
attitude and opinions on tiL~s matter".
I was
surprised to see this statement in print.
Furthermore there is no tag of identity in a given
cancer from a Uranium miner.
Cell types are the
same, Uranium Mine.-,_., smoker, or in an idiopathic
lung cancer. Also in considecing therapy for a
Uranium Miner, there is no different specific
treatment for this cancer categc-,ry.
Certainly, in ai'Y given lung cancer, in a Uranium
Miner, potentials for the effects in product:_c·n o:
the cancer from isotopes must be considered, but not
to the exclusion of all other potentials. Probabilit1·
is to be differentiated from improbability . and
these words are the key to analysis.
(R. 139-140)
or. Archer himself testified that no do~matic statements can be made with regard to causation of cancer.

( R. 118).

If it is to be ruled thdt Dr. Kilpatrlck's opinion lS dogmatlc,
it must be done by inference.

If lnference is allowed to pl:lv

such a role, then it must be remembered that Dr. Arcner
-8-
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testified th,t he CGuld not remember any cases in Utah where
he had testified that a cause of death was other than thE'
result of uranium exposure.

(R. 121).

Certainly such test:.mony

is inferential of a "dogmatic" view opposite to that attributed
to Dr.Kilpatrick.
At this juncture it should be obvious that, in the
words cited..

supra, "we have two diametrically opposed opinions

from very fine medical doctors".
In po:c1.t of fact, this Court is not unaware of the
dichotomy of opinion prevalent in th i ,,, case.

Some of the

same medical experts appeared in Garner v. Hecla Mining Co.,
19 U. 2d 367, 431 P.2d 794,

(1967).

There, plaini: .. ffs urged that

exposure to radon gas accounted for the higher average inc'cdence
of lung cancer in ur;mium miners.

The Industrial Commiss:: c:n

disagreed and denied recovery to the widow and children
(Plaintiffs).

Plaintiffs garnered their evidence from, among

other sources, Dr. Victor E. Archer.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the Industrial
Cornmission, said, at 371:
The fallacy which underlies plaini. :~ ffs'
attack on the Commission's findings is that
they improperly attempt to fc,cus consideration
of the issues exclusively upon thelr own vlew of
the evidence and theories of tl;e case. Whlle
somE aspects of the statistical data and medlcal
theories harmonize with their cou~entlons, others

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fail t0 do so. For instance, Dr. Saccomanno,
the pathologist called by them, acknowledged
the well known but unfortunate uncertainty
as to the cause of cancer.
He readily admitted
that, in any given indiv~dual, "there are a
great many unknown facto:cs as to what might
cause cancer"
and that " . . . it could be
concluded that the radon gas alone didn't
cause the problem incident to the death, but
it's merely based on a statistical study of a
given number of cases."
Consistent with the foregoing and corrz;.borating
the existence of unknown factors and uncertainty
as to causation, is thE· report of the medic:;~
panel to which this case was referred fc!
reexamination:
"We ca::-.not confirm that the lung
carcinoma was caused by exposure to uranium
mining occupatio~•. " There is thus a reasonable
basis in the evidence fo~ the refusal of the
Commission to find in accordance with th<e
plaintiffs' contention.
Upon the principles
states above it is our d•;ty to affirm the
decision.
[footnotes omitted]
It is respectfully submitted, that the Industrial
Commission had before it substantial evidence sufficient to
sustain the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge when
he said:
The Administrative Law Judge after
considering all of the evidence, testimony of .
the parties ar:d the file herein anc.i furtLer notlng
that three doctors made the lnvestlgatlon that led
to the decision of the medical panel, finds that
the deceased, Bill G. Harrison, did not die as
the resu:.t of an occupational d',sease.
POVIT II
Tlil:: OPii\ION OF <·l.EDICAL EXPEJ'.TS DOES 'lOT ?.HOU:-./T TO

BIAS OR PREJUDICE IN THE LEGAL SENSE.
-10-
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AtJ<Jellant' s brief takes the position that the medical
panel sits as judge of medical evidence.

(<Jage 6) .

The

inference is moc<de that the decision of the <Janel is final with
regard to medical evidence.

The concJ us ion which appe llctr. t

wishes to reach is that the "judge" in the instant case was
11

biased.

11

For reasons which will be discussed, infra, the
ass1a. ptions made by appellant are very far from accurate.
rlowever,

accepting the position of appellant

arguendo,

does not help her.
With regard to disqualification of a judge for bias
or prejudice, such bias or prejudice must be for or against a
party.

46 Am. Jur. 2d 198, §167, Judges, states, "The w0rds

'oias' and 'prejudice' refer to the menta1 attidute or disposition
of the judge toward a party to the li tigat:J··n, and not to any
views that he may entertain regarding the subject matter
involved".

§168, 46 Am. Jur. 2d 200, adds, "Bias or prejudice

does not refer to ai'Y views a judge may entertain toward
the subject matter involved in th•" case" . . . "The fact
that a judge has strong feelings about the type of litig;;tion
involved does not make him biased or prejudice"·
It can be seen from the foregoing that "bias" ancl.
"prejudice" are terms of art ·.vith a specifj_,. legal connotation
·.vhich is more narro•,- than those terms convey in a popular sr,nse ·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-11Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

When thcs knowledge is applied to the "medical judge"
in the present case, we see that Dr. Kilpa~rick may hold a
particular view with regard to the subject matte.: of this case.
His view would be that smoking was more prc,bably the cause of
cancer than was exposure tu radon daughters.

The subject matter

would be the causation of lung cancer in uranium miners.

Such

a view cannot reasonably be construed to be a bias which would
go toward a party.

No suggestion has been m:tde th.;t Dr. Kilpatri~

had any feeling toward any of the claimants pe·c-sonally.

In

other words, no bias or pre" udice has been showr, which would
be sufficient to disqualify Dr. Kilpatrick if he were actually
sitting as a judge.
POINT III
OBJE CI'IUN TO COMPOSITION OF THE MEDICAL PANEL WAS
NOT TH1ELY FI:LED.
Continuing, arguendo, the acceptance of plaintiffs
position as stated above, it is obvious th~t Dr. Kilpatrick's
presence on th'= panel was apparent to appellants on Oci::der
5
10,197'

(R. 6) when a le~ter was sent to ~r. Harrison, before

his demise,

indica~ing that the panel had been a~pointed by

T!-lis

the Industrial commission anC. he was to a::pear befoie it.

is not a panel whose membership changes eacr, time i c considers a
case.

· · • s me!TlD· ershl. :",_, thereon 'das a ·dell known
Dr. KilpatrlcK

fact.

The panel report was dated 1-lay 8, 1::176 ·

October 10, 1975, to

~av

19 76,
8
·,

:10

ouJeCtl<•:1

(R.
to

86).

Frorn

D:-. iC.l[Jatr~>

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

Continuing the analogy of d:'..squalification of a
judge, it is generally held that an appli•·ation for disqualif, cation
must be filed at the earliest opportunity.

This rule is mo>t

strictly applied against a party who, having kn•.wledge of facts
which might constitute grounds for disqualification, does not
seek a disqualification until after an unfavorable ruling has
been made.

ReUnion Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381,

(1961);

Cominetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 139 P. 2d 930,
St<•te ex rel. Lefebvre v. Clifford, 118 P. 41,

(1943);

(1911).

Ignoring the lack of bias in the legal sense, discussed
above, it is obvious that appell<:.nt should have made the objection
to Dr. Kilpatrick long be fore the medical p;lnel report was
submitted.
views were

Appellant admits in her brief that Dr. Kilpatrick's
kl~own

to her.

The letter which is used to establJ sh

the allegat:.on was dated August 22, 1975.

(R. 138).

The case

of Barney A. Statcup v. Atlas Minerals, et al, File No. 1Al28600-7, Case No. 1-73-2215, cited by appellant was heard by the
Industrial Commission in Hay of 1975.
Can, therefore, appellant contend that she did not
knuw the position of Dr. Kilpatrj.ck until after the unfavorable
medical report?

Obviously, sucn a position is untenable and the

objection should have been filed at an e,;rlier time·
POUlT IV
THE MEDICAL PANEL DOES NOT, IN FACT, SIT AS JUDGE OF
c1EDIC:'>L ISSUES.

THE PM<EL REPORT IS, PURSUANT TO §35-l-77, UCA,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1953, ONLY CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE IN THE CASE TO THE EXTE;~T IT
IS

SUPPO~TED

BY TESTIMONY.

Pursuant to §35-l-77, UCA, 1953, it has been held,
in denying workmen's compensation benefits to a claimant, that
the Industrial Cormnission did not err in considering the reFort
of a medical panel along with other evidence.

Such reports do

not encroach upon the authority of th•? Con.mission to m.;.ke
findings of fact and conclusions.
U. 2d 414, 424 P.2d 440,

Jensen v. U.S. Fuel Co., 18

(1969).

Relating back to Po!cnt I, supra, the panel report, the
testimony of Dr. Kilpatrick, supported by other members of the
panel, and that of Dr. Archer were all before the Commission to
be weighed in arriv:.J•g at their decision.
considered.

Each item was

The panel did not act as judge with regard to

ultimate medical issues.

Thf• Inclustrial Commiss ;, n so acts

and appell.:.nt concedes this in her brief, at pa.,;e 7:
Appellant recognizes and agrees that the
report of the medical board is not cr,nclusi ve
and is evidence to be considered by the
Commission in arriving at a decision.
The Garner case, supra, addresses thLs same issue when
it says, at 19 U. 2d 370:
Under our statutes and long established
decisional law there are insuperable obstacles
to the granting of tje relief sought by
plaintiffs on this appe~l:
1t was thelr burden
to shol•' affirmatively and to so persuade the
commission that Mr. Garner's death resulted from
a disease cau5ed by his occupat1on.
It lS tne
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prerogative of the Commission, ar.d n<,t of any
medJ.cal pan•= I, to JUdge the cn•dJ.bJ.lJ.ty of the
evJ.dence, and upon the basis of the whc;le
evJ.dence to deternune the facts.
The plaintiffs
havJ.ng faJ.led to so persuade the Comrniss.'con, it
is thr, duty of this court to survey the evidence
J.n the lJght most favoranle to the findings and
order; and we cannot reverse and compel an award
unless the:-e is credible evide1'ce without substantial contradiction which points so clearly
and persuasively in plaintiffs' favor that
failure to so find must be regarded as capricious and arbitrary.
Conversely, if there is
any reasonable basis in the evidence, or from
the l<tck of evidence, which wiJ 1 justify the
refusal to so find, we must affirm.
[footnotes
omitted, emphasis added]
Given all of the foregoing, it is obvious that the statements in appellant's brief, with regard to an analog:: betw.~en
the panel and judges, is co:o.pletely without foundation.

The

quotation'cited above also sustains the position of respondent
taken in Point I of this brief.
CONCLUSION
In Summary, it is obvious that the Industrial Commission
had before it all of tne available medical reports, opinions
and ev~dence.

Based on the record a choice was made by the

Administr,.tive Law Judge and w.~.s sustained by the Commission·
It is imt.ortant to note that neither of the two principle experts
were as dogmatic in their view as alleged by appellant.
conceded the relevancy of many factors with regard to
causatio-, of cancer, including exposure to radon daughters
and smokJ.ng.
It is asserted th"'

sense.

no bias existed in a legal

It is, furtl:er, asserted tr •.• t no bias tainted the
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form.

Appellant admits this fact implicitly when she states

in her brief,

at page 7,

"

.

. In effect her medical claim

has been examined by two impartial examiners and one very biased
examiner

It cannot logically be asserted that bias,

even if i t did exist, tainted the decision herein.

Ar.y bias,

legal or Othf~:;, is cleared when one admit.s that disinte:·.·ested,
impartial examiners agn;ed wiU· the result.
DATED and respectuJly submitted this

day of

January, 1978.
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